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JURORS -USE OF CHALLENGES FOR
EXCLUSION OF VENIREMEN WHO OPPOSE
IMPOSITION OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT*
A jury reflects the attitudes and mores of the commun-
ity from which it is drawn. It lives only for the day and
does justice according to its limits .... It is as human as
the people who make it up. It is sometimes the victim of
passion. But it also takes the sharp edges off a law and
uses conscience to ameliorate a hardship. Since it is of
and from the community, it gives the law an acceptance
which verdicts of judges could not do.1
I. INTRODUOTION
The right of an accused in a criminal prosecution to trial "by
an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed ... ,2 is "a fundamental right, essen-
tial for preventing miscarriages of justice and for assuring that
fair trials are provided for all defendants."3 So hallowed has the
right to trial by jury been in the United States that the original
Bill of Rights included the specific guarantee of trial by jury,4
that the constitution of every state has provided a corresponding
right in serious criminal cases, 5 and that the fourteenth amend-
ment to the United States Constitution has been held to guaran-
tee to a defendant in a state court the same right to trial by jury
*People v. Sears, 74 Cal. Rptr. 872, 450 P.2d 248 (1969).
1. W. DOUGLAS, WE THE JUDGES 389 (1956).
2. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
3. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 158 (1968).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides, in part:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed ...
5. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 154 (1968). S.C. CoNsT. art 1, § 18
provides:
§ 18. Trial by jury; witnesses; defense. In all criminal prosecu-
tions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial
by an impartial jury, and to be fully informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to be fully heard in his defense by himself or by his
counsel or by both.
1
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which article III and the sixth amendment guarantee to an ac-
cused in a federal court.
6
The concept of trial by jury, theoretically sound, will justifi-
ably remain an integral part of the American judicial scheme.
The jury system itself, as a matter of day-to-day practice, is,
however, necessarily involved in a continuing process of judicial
and legislative redefinition and reinterpretation in an attempt to
minimize the disruptive impact of the most significant variable
in the system: man-man with all his strengths and weaknesses,
opinions and prejudices, characteristics and peculiarities. People
v. Sears7 is dramatically illustrative of one important area in
which this process of redefinition and reinterpretation is now
occurring. Two legal tools - the challenge for cause and the
peremptory challenge--have been improvised to lessen appre-
ciably the possibility that the human variable will jeopardize the
efficacious operation of the jury system in one of its most im-
portant functions: deciding whether a fellow man shall live or
die.8
In PeopZe v. Sears9 the defendant appealed from a judgment
of the Superior Court of California wherein he had been found
guilty of and had been sentenced to death for the first degree
murder of his step-daughter, the attempted murder of his wife,
and the attempted murder of his mother-in-law. The Supreme
6. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). The Court, in making
the sixth amendment guarantee of jury trial obligatory on the states through
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, declared:
Because we believe that trial by jury in criminal cases is funda-
mental to the American scheme of justice, we hold that the Four-
teenth Amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in all criminal
cases which-were they to be tried in a federal court-would come
within the Sixth Amendment's guarantee.
7. 74 Cal. Rptr. 872, 450 P.2d 248 (1969).
8. The two functions of the jury in capital cases are the determinations,
first, of guilt or innocence and, second, of punishment. South Carolina, in
accord with a majority of the states, employs a one-verdict procedure where-
by the jury delivers one unanimous verdict as to guilt or innocence and punish-
ment. The jury retains, however, discretion as to whether a defendant shall be
sentenced to death or to life imprisonment. S.C. CoDa ANN. § 16-52 (1962),
which survived a recent court test in State v. Harper, 251 S.C. 379, 162 S.E2d
712 (1968), provides:
§ 16-52. Punishment for murder.-Whoever is guilty of murder
shall suffer the punishment of death; provided, however, that in any
case in which the prisoner is found guilty of murder the jury may
find a special verdict recommending him to the mercy of the court,
whereupon the punishment shall be reduced to imprisonment in the
Penitentiary with hard labor during the whole lifetime of the
prisoner.
See Comment, Crminal Procedure--South Carolina Death Penalty Statutes-
Guilty Pleas-Sentencing by the Jury, 20 S.C.L. REv. 841 (1968).
9. 74 Cal. Rptr. 872, 450 P.2d 248 (1969).
19701
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Court of California affirmed the judgment of the superior court
as to guilt but reversed as to penalty. In so reversing, the court
said:
In the instant case six prospective jurors were excused
for cause solely on the basis of their own expressions of
opinion that it would be either "difficult" or "unfair"
for them to serve on the jury because they were
(cagainst" capital punishment, did not "believe" in it, or
felt it was "not warranted."
None of these jurors stated "unambiguously that he
would automatically vote against the imposition of capi-
ital punishment... [regardless of] what the trial might
reveal, .... " First, under Witherspoon it cannot be
assumed that a person who merely states he is "against"
capital punishment, does not "believe" in it, or feels it
is "not warranted" would never, as a juror, vote to im-
pose it or even consider doing so.
Second, the questions asked of the six excluded jurors
did not even deal with their willingness to consider the
evidence before automatically committing themselves to
vote against the death penalty. 10
In rejecting the contention by the prosecution "that the exclusion
of the jurors with reservations concerning capital punishment
was, if erroneous, harmless since the prosecutor had unexercised
peremptory challenges which he could have used to remove these
jurors. . "" the court stated further:
We cannot assume that a prosecutor would abuse the
high responsibilities of his office by employing per-
emptory challenges to accomplish an otherwise constitu-
tionally impermissible result, the impaneling of a jury
"uncommonly willing to condemn a man to die."' 2
The court noted moreover:
[A] prosecutor who uses peremptory challenges for the
10. Id. at 880, 450 P.gd at 256 (emphasis added, footnotes omitted). See
Comment, Criminal Procedure-Empaneling Jurors-Death Sentence Inval-
idated When Venireinen Excluded for Voicing Scruples Against Imposition of
Capital Punishment, 20 S.C.L. REv. 833 (1968), which discusses Witherspoon
v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968) as it affects the viability of the death penalty
as an alternative punishment and as its rationale might be extended to the guilt-
determining process.
11. 74 Cal. Rptr. 872, 881, 450 P.2d 248, 257 (1969) (emphasis added).
12. Id. at 881, 450 P.2d at 257 (emphasis added).
[Vol. 22
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purpose of producing such a jury is violating his obliga-
tion to assure the defendant a fair trial.13
In theory the challenge for cause and the peremptory challenge
are tools whereby both the state and the accused can protect their
interests in obtaining a "trial, by an impartial jury of the State
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed .... M4
In practice, however, the challenge for cause and the peremptory
challenge are themselves subject to the disruptive influence of
the human variable. Sears further redefines and reinterprets the
challenge for cause and the peremptory challenge, theoretically
workable and understandable, as necessarily circumscribed by
the practical, day-to-day, human environment in which they
must be applied. Sears, first, outlines more definitive guidelines
for the conduct of voir dire examinations of veniremen consistent
with the Witherspoon requirements for a challenge for cause,' 5
and, second, requires a much closer scrutiny by the courts of a
prosecutor's use of the peremptory challenge.
What is now of consequence for the practicing attorney is an
understanding of the evolution of the two challenges as they
relate to capital punishment. Through such an understanding the
Sears case will produce a more intelligent exercise of the chal-
lenge for cause and the peremptory challenge by an attorney-
prosecutor or defense counsel-who is cognizant of the role which
he plays in the redefinition-reinterpretation process and who
can therefore better acquire an impartial jury.
By way of historical analysis this comment will show (1) how
the process of redefinition and reinterpretation of the jury sys-
tem has produced the result found in the Sears case and (2) what
the process purportedly suggests for the immediate future. Then
it will attempt to formulate rules and standards, applicable in
South Carolina, to govern the use of the two challenges to ex-
clude veniremen who oppose capital punishment.
II. CHA ENaGI FOR CAUSE
The right to trial by an impartial jury is broadly defined by
two principles. First, the process by which court officials desig-
nate prospective jurors shall be free of the systematic or inten-
tional exclusion of any group or class of persons. This principle
13. Id. at 881 n.5, 450 P.2d at 257 n.5 (emphasis added).
14. U.S. CoxsT. amend. VI (emphasis added).
15. See text accompanying note 72 infra.
1970]
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envisions "a body truly representative of the community,"' 6 a
jury which is drawn from a cross-section "of the State and dis-
trict wherein the crime shall have been committed... ,"17 but by
no means warrants that every jury will contain representatives of
all the particular social, economic, racial, religious, political, or
geographical segments of a community."" Second, the jurors
finally selected must be qualified, fair, unbiased, and impartial.'9
The trial court has a serious duty and a broad discretion to ascer-
tain whether a juror is, in fact, qualified, fair, unbiased, and
impartial. 20
Irvin v. Dowd2l illustrates the general standards for juror
impartiality. Petitioner for habeas corpus had been convicted of
murder and sentenced to death. The Supreme Court, reversing
and remanding the case on the grounds that there was a denial
of due process under the fourteenth amendment, because jurors
with pre-conceived and unalterable opinions about the guilt of
the defendant were allowed to sit, stated:
In essence, the right to jury trial guarantees to the crim-
inally accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial, 'indif-
ferent' jurors. The failure to accord an accused a fair
hearing violates even the minimal standards of due
process.--
The Court continued, however:
Impartiality is not a technical conception. It is a state of
mind. For the ascertainment of this mental attitude of
appropriate indifference, the Constitution lays down no
particular tests and procedure is not chained to any
ancient and artificial formula.23
16. Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940). In Glasser v. United States,
315 U.S. 60 (1942), the Court declared:
[T]he proper functioning of the jury system, and, indeed, our de-
mocracy itself, requires that the jury be a "body truly representa-
tive of the community," and not the organ of any special group or
class.
Id. at 86. The notion, as popularly stated, that an accused has a right to be tried
by one's peers is simply not true. Such a notion, inherited from the common
law, has never found acceptance within the American concept, founded as it is
upon a democratic society, of what constitutes a proper jury. Id. at 85.
17. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VL
18. Thiel v. Southern P. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946).
19. State v. Rasor, 168 S.C. 221, 235, 167 S.E. 396, 4P. (1933).
20. Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 168 (1950).
21. 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
22. Id. at 722.




Gibbes: Use of Challenges for Exclusion of Venirmen Who Oppose Imposition
Published by Scholar Commons,
CoMEXTs
An "impartial" jury "is as human as the people who make it
up." 24 Impartiality becomes, therefore, a relative term for the
determination of the court at a particular point in time.
In South Carolina the question of the impartiality of a pro-
spective juror is a matter for the court.25 Section 88-202 of the
Code of Laws of South Carolina of 1962 prescribes the manner
in which the court will conduct the voir dire examination of veni-
remen and the reasons for which disqualification or exclusion for
cause may occur:
§38-202. Jurors may be examined by court; if not indif-
ferent, shall be set aside. - The court shall, on motion of
either party in the suit, examine on oath any person who
is called as a juror therein to know whether he is related
to either party, has any interest in the cause, has ex-
pressed or formed any opinion or is sensible of any bias
or prejudice therein, and the party objecting to the juror
may introduce any other competent evidence in support
of the objection. If it appears to the court that the juror
is not indifferent in the cause, he shall be placed aside
as to the trial of that cause and another shall be called.26
Cognizant of the difficulty in delineating the bounds of impar-
tiality, the court, in State v. Gantt,2 7 noted: "The law does not
require that a juror should be perfectly free from all impressions
and opinions as to the issue."128 In State v. Fuller 2 9 the court fur-
ther explained that what the law requires is a juror who is impar-
tial, whose opinion can be changed by the evidence, and who can
stand indifferent between the state and the accused.30
In Logan v. United States,31 decided in 1892, the first major
case involving the particular problem of scruples against capital
punishment, the Supreme Court stated that a juror who has con-
scientious scruples against capital punishment is not impartial
and may be challenged for cause. The Court declared:
24. W. DOUGLAS, WE THE JUDGES 389 (1956).
25. State v. Dodson, 16 S.C. 453, 459 (1882).
26. S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-202 (1962).
27. 223 S.C. 431, 76 S.E.2d 674 (1953).
28. Id. at 437, 76 S.E2d at 677, quoting from State v. Hayes, 69 S.C. 295,
48 S.E. 251 (1904).
29. 229 S.C. 439, 93 S.E.2d 463 (1956).
30. Id. at 447, 93 S.E.2d at 467-68. Thus, a juror who states that he has
formed an opinion, but that the opinion will yield to the evidence presented at
the trial and that be can render a fair and impartial verdict may be impaneled.
Id. at 447, 93 S.E2d at 467-68; citing precedent as old as Sims v. Jones, 43 S.C.
91, 94, 20 S.E. 905, 906 (1895).
31. 144 U.S. 263 (1892).
1970]
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A juror who has conscientious scruples on any subject,
which prevent him from standing indifferent between
the government and the accused, and from trying the
case according to the law and the evidence, is not an
impartial juror.
8 2
One year earlier, in 1891, the Supreme Court of South Carolina,
in State v. James,33 had reached a similar result in holding that
the entertaining of conscientious scruples against capital punish-
ment is a ground for a challenge for cause and that it is, there-
fore, proper to interrogate a venireman on that subject.8 4 In 1892,
in State v. Mclntosh,3  the trial court asked a prospective juror
during the voir dire examination whether he was opposed to cap-
ital punishment. The venireman replied, simply, "Well, I am
inclined that way, sir."13 The trial judge excluded the venireman
from the jury for cause. In State v. Hyde,3 7 decided in 1912, the
court held that it was not an abuse of discretion to excuse for
cause those jurors who were opposed to capital punishment.8 8 In
State v. Bethune9 the court cautioned, however, that the court is
only bound to ask those questions required by statute40 and that
any further examination of prospective jurors is entirely within
the discretion of the trial judge, who is subject to review only for
abuse of that discretion.
41
In 1929, in State v. RobnsonA2 the court, citing as precedent
State v. James43 and State v. Hyde,44 held that it was proper to
exclude from the jury in a murder trial those persons admitting a
"disbelief" in capital punishment.45 A similar result was reached
in State v. Griggs," decided in 1937, where those prospective
jurors who answered the question--"Are you opposed to capital
32. Id. at 298.
33. 34 S.C. 49, 12 S.E. 657 (1891), petition for rehearing denied, 34 S.C.
579, 13 S.E. 325 (1891).
34. Id. at 52, 12 S.E. at 658.
35. 39 S.C. 97, 17 S.E. 446 (1892).
36. Id. at 107, 17 S.E. at 449.
37. 90 S.C. 296, 73 S.E. 180 (1912).
38. Id. at 298, 73 S.E. at 181.
39. 93 S.C. 195, 75 S.E. 281 (1912).
40. Questions relating to a venireman's views concerning capital punishment
were not then, and are not now, specifically required to be asked by statute. See
S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-202 (1962).
41. State v. Bethune, 93 S.C. 195, 199, 75 S.E. 281, 282 (1912).
42. 149 S.C. 439, 147 S.E. 441 (1929).
43. 34 S.C. 49, 12 S.E. 657 (1891), petition for rehearing denied, 34 S.C. 579,
13 S.E. 325 (1891).
44. 90 S.C. 296, 73 S.E. 180 (1912).
45. State v. Robinson, 149 S.C. 439, 442-43, 147 S.E. 441, 442-43 (1929).
46. 184 S.C. 304, 192 S.E. 360 (1937).
[Vol. 2'2
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punishment-that is, electrocution?" 47-in the affirmative were
excused for cause.48 In State v. Lewis, 49 the court in 1952, affirm-
ing both the conviction and the sentence, held that it was proper
to seat a juror who on previous occasions had stated that he was
opposed to capital punishment but who on the present occasion
declared that he was not opposed to such a penalty. The court
re-emphasized that the qualification of the juror was largely
within the discretion of the trial judge absent a clear showing of
abuse of that discretion.50
In United States v. Puff,51 the appellant claimed error ii that
several jurors had been excused for cause after merely replying,
"I do," when asked if they had scruples against capital punish-
ment. The defendant objected because these jurors were "sum-
marily excused by the Court without the slightest probing into
the character or strength of their convictions, doubts, or scru-
pZes."51 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in affirming both
the conviction and the sentence, found no error in the conduct of
the voir dire examination on the grounds that, even if such fail-
ure to probe were error, it was harmless error, because the jurors
in question were excused and the jury which sat was an impar-
tial jury.53 The continuing process of redefinition and reinter-
pretation of what constitutes adequate grounds for a challenge
for cause as it relates to capital punishment was, however, highly
evident. The language used by the defendant in stating his objec-
tion to the exclusion for cause of those prospective jurors with
apparently superficial scruples against capital punishment was
significantly suggestive of the phraseology later employed by the
courts in the Witherspoon"4 and the Sears55 decisions.
If the Puff decision was indicative of the direction which the
courts would take, the South Carolina case of State v. Britt5 6
reaffirmed established law. In reasserting that it is the duty of
47. Id. at 311, 192 S.E. at 363.
48. Id.
49. 221 S.C. 491, 71 S.E.2d 308 (1952).
50. Id. at 495-96, 71 S.E.2d at 310.
51. 211 F.2d 171 (2d Cir. 1954).
52. Id. at 186 (emphasis added).
53. Id. at 186.
54. 391 U.S. 510 (1968). "Thirty-nine veniremen ... were excluded without
any effort to find out whether their scruples would invariably compel them to
vote against capital punishment." Id. at 514-15.
55. 74 Cal. Rptr. 872, 450 P.2d 248 (1969). "We are left entirely to spec-
ulation in seeking to determine why each juror felt his opposition to the death
penalty would make it unfair or difficult for him to serve as a juror." Id. at
880, 450 P.2d at 256.
56. 237 S.C. 293, 117 S.E.2d 379 (1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 886 (1961).
1970]
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the trial judge to assure himself that every juror is unbiased, fair,
impartial, and qualified,57 the court held that the trial judge in
the instant case had made an adequate examination of prospec-
tive jurors within the requirements of section 38-202 of the 1952
Code and that there was no abuse of discretion on the part of the
court in asking prospective jurors the question---"Are you op-
posed to capital punishment?"*8 - rather than the question -
"Are you conscious of any bias or prejudice either in favor of or
against capital punishment? g  as proposed by defense
counsel.60
State v. Young,01 decided in 1961, was representative of the
final step, the culminating thrust, in the cycle of redefinition and
reinterpretation prior to Witherspoon and Sears. In holding that
the questions propounded by the trial judge to prospective jurors
as to their understanding of the term, "capital punishment," were
57. Id. at 305, 117 S.E.2d at 385.
58. Id. at 304, 117 S.E2d at 385.
59. Id.
60. Id. The court held, further, that the trial judge did not abuse the discre-
tion vested in him when he denied defense counsel the right of cross-examina-
tion of prospective jurors on the voir dire. The court noted that, while defense
counsel may be permitted under section 38-202 of the 1952 Code (unchanged in
the Code of Laws of South Carolina of 1962) to examine veniremen, it is better
practice for the judge to conduct such examinations. Id. at 311, 117 S.E.2d
at 388. Rule 24(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
The court may permit the defendant or his attorney and the at-
torney for the government to conduct the examination of prospec-
tive jurors or may itself conduct the examination. In the latter
event the court shall permit the defendant or his attorney and the
attorney for the government to supplement the examination by
such further inquiry as it deems proper or shall itself submit to
the prospective jurors such additional questions by the parties or
their attorneys as it deems proper.
The American Bar Association takes this position on the conduct of the voir
dire examination:
A voir dire examination should be conducted for the purpose of
discovering bases for challenge for cause and for the purpose of
gaining knowledge to enable an intelligent exercise of peremp-
tory challenges. The judge should initiate the voir dire examination
by identifying the parties and their respective counsel and by
briefly outlining the nature of the case. The judge should then put
to the prospective jurors any questions which he thinks necessary,
touching their qualifications to serve as jurors in the cause on
trial. The judge should also permit such additional questions by
the defendant or his attorney and the prosecuting attorney as he
deems reasonable and proper.
ABA Pnoj=r ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS
RELATING To TRIAL By JURY, APPROVED DRAFT, 1968, § 2.4 (1968).
61. 238 S.C. 115, 119 S.E.2d 504 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 868 (1961).
[Vol. 122
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not an abuse of discretion, 2 the court recognized the necessity for
"probing into the character or strength of... [the jurors'] con-
victions, doubts, or scruples.163 The foundation for Witherspoa
and Sears had been laid.
In Witherspoon v. Illinois"4 the Court held:
1A] sentence of death cannot be carried out if the jury
that imposed or recommended it was chosen by exclud-
ing veniremen for cause simply because they voiced gen-
eral objections to the death penalty or expressed con-
scientious or religious scruples against its infliction.6 5
"General objections," "conscientious or religious scruples"-what
do these vague abstractions mean in daily practice? In dictum
the Court proclaimed that those veniremen could still be excused
for cause who "made unmistakably clear . . .that they would
automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment
without regard to any evidence that might be developed at the
trial of the case before them .... 11,6 But where, as a matter of
law, do "general objections" and "conscientious or religious
scruples" become "unmistakably clear" expressions of a venire-
62. Id. at 121-22, 119 S.E.2d at 507-08. The court's voir dire examination of
M. Goodwin, Jr., was, in part, as follows:
Q. Do you know of anything which would embarrass you, if
you are chosen to serve as a juror? A. No, sir.
Q. Are you opposed to capital punishment? A. No, sir.
Q. You know what capital punishment is? A. I do.
Q. Well, are you opposed to capital punishment?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Are you opposed to capital punishment? A. I'm not.
Q. Now, you said yes and you said no. Now, do you understand
what capital punishment is? A. I understand what it is.
Q. What is it? A. Capital punishment is where a defendant is
found guilty.
Q. Capital punishment is provided, I'll explain it to you, in cer-
tain cases, for instance rape or murder, if a defendant is found
guilty as charged and not recommended to the mercy of the Court,
then the punishment provided for in such cases is death by electro-
cution. That's what is meant by capital punishment. Now, I ask
you do you understand what's meant by capital punishment? A.
Yes, sir.
Q. Well, now are you opposed to capital punishment? You know
what opposed means? Are you against it?
A. I'm not against it.
Q. Well, would you then if the evidence warranted it, would you
under those conditions vote for a verdict of guilty if it meant elec-
trocution? A. Yes, sir.
Q. You would? A. Yes.
Q. Unless there is some other question, the juror is qualified.
63. United States v. Puff, 211 F.2d 171, 186 (2d Cir. 1954).
64. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
65. Id. at 522.
66. Id. at 522 n.21.
1970]
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man's unwillingness to consider the imposition of the death pen-
alty? How far into the mind of a prospective juror must a court
delve before it has satisfied the Witepoon requirements?
It is to this precise question that the court in People V. Sears
necessarily addresses itself. The trial judge addressed the entire
jury panel at the beginning of the voir dire examination:
I will ask now generally if there are any of you pres-
ently seated in the jury box that are opposed to the
imposition of the death penalty, if under the evidence,
it would appear in the exercise of your discretion that it
would be a proper judgment.
Any of you have any conscientious scruples or views
which would preclude you in what would be termed to
be a proper case . . . from voting for the death pen-
alty?67
The interrogatory--"Is there anything about the nature of this
case that would make it unfair [or "difficult"] for you to serve
as a juror? "08-was then directed to prospective jurors. The court
found reversible error in that, first, none of the excluded jurors
stated "unambiguously that he would automatically vote against
the imposition of capital punishment... "69 and, second, the ques-
tions asked of the prospective jurors were neither probing nor
definitive as to the veniremen's willingness to consider the evi-
dence before automatically committing themselves to vote against
the death penalty.70
The court articulated three standards which the trial court had
failed to satisfy.
67. 74 Cal. Rptr. 872, 880 n.3, 450 P.2d 248, 256 n.3 (1969).
68. Id. at 880, 450 P.2d at 256. The opinion of the court cites this inter-
rogatory as a "typical question." Id. at 880, 450 P.2d at 256. One concrete
example cited by the court is as follows: "Is there anything about the nature
of the case that would make it difficult or impossible for you to serve as an
impartial juror?" The juror's reply was: "Yes, Your Honor, I think because
of the nature of the case and my own personal feeling about capital punishment,
I'd like to be excused." Id. at 880 n.2, 450 P2d at 256 r2.
69. Id. at 880, 450 P2d at 256, quoting from Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391
U.S. 510, 515-16 n.9 (1968).
70. 74 Cal. Rptr. 872, 880, 450 P2d 248, 256 (1969). See People v. Risen-
hoover, 73 Cal. Rptr. 533, 544, 447 P.2d 925, 936 (1968) where a juror who
thought she "probably" had scruples against capital punishment was held to
have been wrongly excluded; Its re Anderson, 73 Cal. Rptr. 21, 24, 447 P.2d
117, 120 (1968) where, to the question-"Do you know of any reason you
couldn't be a fair and impartial juror in this case?"--the answer, held unsatis-
factory for exclusion under Witherspoon, was-'Yes, sir, I do. I don't believe
in capital punishment"; and People v. Chacon, 73 Cal. Rptr. 10, 14-15, 447 P2d
106, 110-11 (1968) where "I don't think so" was held to be an unsatisfactory
answer to a capital punishment interrogatory.
[Vol. 22
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First, the trial judge must delineate the criterion for
juror exclusion established in Witherspoon to prospec-
tive jurors.
Second, the trial judge must specify what will happen to
a venireman who meets the Witherspoon standards for
exclusion.
Third, if the trial judge elects to use the term, "proper
case," he must instruct the prospective juror that, in
such a jurisdiction, each individual juror has total
discretion to determine what-may be a "proper" case for
imposing the death penalty without guidance from the
court or the legislature.71
The court reversed the decision of the trial court as to penalty:
"According to our understanding of Witherspoon, reversal is
autornatically required if a venireman was improperly excused
for cause on the basis of his opposition to the death penalty.1
72
The right to trial by an impartial jury comprehends the rejec-
tion of those veniremen who are not "willing to consider all of
the penalties provided by state law." 73 In order to ensure that an
accused is not sentenced to death by "a jury uncommonly willing
to condemn a man to die" 74-that is, a jury "[c]ulled of all who
harbor doubts about the wisdom of capital punishment" 75-the
Court in Witherspoon significantly narrowed the grounds for
exclusion for cause of prospective jurors who are opposed in
greater or lesser degrees to the infliction of the death penalty.
The Sears court redefined and reinterpreted what was decided
in IVitherspoon within the context of existing state law and ap-
plicable rules of procedure.
As a matter of practice in South Carolina, what would appear
to be required, what would at least be sound policy in order to
minimize the risk of reversal as to penalty, is the oir dire exami-
nation of prospective jurors in capital cases to include the fol-
lowing elements:
First, the term, "capital punishment," should be clearly
and intelligibly defined. (The necessity for such defini-
71. 74 Cal. Rptr. 872, 880 n.3, 450 P2d 248, 256 n.3 (1969).
72. Id. at 881, 450 P2d at 257, quoting from In. re Anderson 73 Cal. Rptr.
21, 26, 447 P.2d 117, 122 (1968) (emphasis added).
73. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522 n.21 (1968).
74. Id. at 521 (footnote omitted).
75. Id. at 520.
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tion has been adequately demonstrated in cases such as
the Young case. See note 62 infra.)
Second, the code section which prescribes the alternative
punishments for the offense charged should be explained
to include, where applicable, an instruction emphasizing
that the choice between imposition of the death penalty
and a recommendation to the mercy of the court is solely
within the discretion of the jury without guidance from
the court or the legislature.7 6 (See text accompanying
note 71 infra).
Third, the Witherspoon requirements for juror exclusion
should be articulated.
Fourth, the procedural result of the exclusion for cause
of a venireman should be specified.
Fifth, the first four elements should be restated if
veniremen are at any time introduced who were not
present during the making of the initial remarks to the
prospective jurors."7
How much time will be required to complete such an extensive
voir dire examination is certainly a matter for consideration
when court dockets are already crowded. Weighed against the
possibility of reversal, retrial, and the imposition of the death
penalty by a "hanging jury," the time necessary for a more prob-
ing examination will, however, be of small consequence.
76. See generally State v. Hamilton, 251 S.C. 1, 159 S.E.2d 607 (1968)
where the court, by way of dictum, suggested the possibility of voir dire in-
quiry into a venireman's views as to a recommendation that the death sentence
not be imposed:
While we see no abuse of discretion or denial of a constitutional
right, we cannot but observe that, in view of the jury's power...
to recommend that the death sentence be not imposed, it would (be)
a wise exercise of discretion for the judge to inquire of veniremen
on the voir dire whether they had any opinion which would prevent
their making such a recommendation.
Id. at 7, 159 S.E.2d at 610, quoting from Commonwealth v. Ladetto, 349 Mass.
237, 245, 207 N.E.2d 536, 541-42 (1965).
77. In People v. Teale, 75 Cal. Rptr. 172, 450 P.2d 564 (1969), the court
said:
[W]e cannot realistically consider a venireman's response to a
question on voir dire examination as an hermetically sealed unit
wholly unrelated to its context.
Id. at 184, 450 P.2d at 576. The court found that its duty was to "evaluate the
examination of the challenged venireman 'in the full context and setting of the
voir dire examination conducted up until the time [the venireman] was ex-
cused.'" Id. at 185, 450 P.2d at 577. While the general rule here stated ap-
plies, the necessity for repeating those remarks which were made prior to a ve-
nireman's being called is obvious.
(Vol. 2
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III. PMMMTORY CHA=NGE
Although there is nothing in the Constitution which requires
that the right of peremptory challenge be extended to the parties
in a criminal prosecution, both the federal system and the paral-
lel state systems include statutory provisions for the exercise of
such a challenge.78 The essential nature of the peremptory chal-
lenge, inherited from the common law, has been that of one
exercised without the necessity of giving a legally cognizable
reason for its employment, without judicial inquiry as to why it
has been presented, and without being subject to the control of
the court.
79
In Swain v. Alabama,80 in affirming both the conviction and
the sentence of death of a defendant indicted for rape, the Court
firmly declared that the peremptory challenge is one of the most
important rights secured to an accused and noted:
The function of the [peremptory] challenge is not only
to eliminate extremes of partiality on both sides, but to
assure the parties that the jurors before whom they try
the case will decide on the basis of the evidence placed
before them, and not otherwise.8 '
The number of peremptory challenges allowed to the parties
in a criminal prosecution is governed by statute.82 Section 38-211
of the Code of Laws of South Carolina of 1962 provides, in part:
§38-211. Peremptory challenges in criminal cases.-Any
person who shall be arraigned for the crime of murder,
manslaughter, burglary, arson, rape, grand larceny,
breach of trust when it shall be punishable as for grand
larceny, perjury or forgery shall be entitled to per-
emptory challenges not exceeding ten and the State in
such cases shall be entitled to peremptory challenges not
exceeding five.83
The power of the legislature of a state to prescribe any number
78. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 217 (1965).
79. Id. at 220.
80. Id. at 202.
81. Id. at 219.
82. See State v. Woods, 189 S.C. 281, 309, 1 S.E.2d 190, 203 (1939).
83. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 38-211 (1962). See Rule 24(b) of the Federal Rules
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of peremptory challenges is, however, modified only by the neces-
sity of having enough jurors available.
84
In State v. Carson,s5 an appeal from a conviction for the ille-
gal manufacturing of whiskey,86 the court decided that the 'oir
dire examination of jurors may be conducted not only to develop
grounds for a challenge for cause, but also to inform the parties
so that they may make intelligent use of their peremptory chal-
lenges.87 The court, in United States v. Napoleone,88 noted fur-
ther that the voir dire examination should be extensive, probing,
and a necessary predicate for the effective exercise of the per-
emptory challenge.
8 9
The popular concept of the peremptory challenge, and for that
matter, the concept superficially recognized by many courts, has
been that of a challenge, broad, sweeping, and unbridled. In the
Swain case the Court held, as a matter of law, that the Constitu-
tion does not require an examination of a prosecutor's reasons for
the exercise of his peremptory challenges in any given case.90 The
Court stated, moreover, that "[tihe presumption in any particular
case must be that the prosecutor is using the State's challenges to
obtain a fair and impartial jury ... , 1 In State v. RichbUrg
9N
the court specified that the five peremptory challenges given the
state and the ten granted to the defendant under section 38-211
of the 1962 code may be used for any cause satisfactory to counsel
or for no cause and that neither the trial judge nor the supreme
court would interfere.
93
In a criminal trial the prosecuting attorney is not, however, the
representative "of an ordinary party to a controversy but of a
sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compel-
ling as its obligation to govern at all .... ."94 The interest of the
84. Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887). The Court held that the num-
ber of peremptory challenges allowed an accused may well vary within differ-
ent sections of the same state according to the density of the population and the
difficulty of obtaining an impartial jury. Id. at 70.
85. 131 S.C. 42, 126 S.E. 757 (1925).
86. Id. at 43, 126 S.E. at 758.
87. Id. at 45, 126 S.E. at 758.
88. 349 F.2d 350 (3d Cir. 1965).
89. Id. at 353. This position is reaffirmed by the stand taken by the Ameri-
can Bar Association. See note 60 supra.
90. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 222 (1965).
91. Id. at 222.
92. 250 S.C. 451, 158 S.E.2d 769 (1968).
93. Id. at 461, 158 S.E.2d at 773.
94. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
[Vol. 2
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state in a criminal prosecution is, therefore, "not that it shall win
a case, but that justice shall be done."95
Whatever the popular concept of the peremptory challenge
may be, the peremptory challenge is not without its limitation.
The Sears court, delineating the nature of this limitation, makes
poignantly clear that a prosecutor who uses "peremptory chal-
lenges to accomplish an otherwise constitutionally impermissible
result, the impaneling of a jury 'uncommonly willing to condemn
a man to die' , 96 "is violating his obligation to assure the defend-
ant a fair trial,"97 and that such use is itself constitutionally
impermissible. Distinguishing the Swain case where the Court
refused to "hold that the Constitution requires an examination of
the prosecutor's reasons for the exercise of his [peremptory] chal-
lenges in any given case,"19 8 the Sears court continued:
[I]n light of the Witherspoon definition of a capital
jury which is "impartial" on the issue of imposing the
death penalty it cannot be assumed that a prosecutor
who uses peremptory challenges to remove all jurors
who have reservations concerning the death penalty is
acting on the basis of "acceptable considerations."99
In the future a prosecutor's use of the peremptory challenge will,
therefore, be more closely scrutinized against existing constitu-
tionaZ standards and within the scope of the voir dire examina-
tion as a whole to determine whether a constitutionally permissi-
ble tool is being used to produce an unconstitutional result.
IV. CONCLUSION
"A jury... is as human as the people who make it up."'10 0 "Im-
partiality... is a state of mind." 10 '
The process of redefinition and reinterpretation of the jury
system as it relates to challenges for cause and peremptory chal-
lenges is understandably a continuing search for a still better
manner of attaining juror "impartiality." The translation of
95. Id. at 88. ABA CANONS OF PRoFEssIo1AL ETHICS No. 5 provides, in
part: "The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is not to
convict, but to see that justice is done."
96. 74 Cal. Rptr. 872, 881, 450 P.2d 248, 257 (1969).
97. Id. at 881 n.5, 450 P.2d at 257 n.5.
98. 380 U.S. 202, 222 (1965) (emphasis added).
99. 74 Cal. Rptr. 872, 881-82 n.5, 450 P.2d 248, 257-58 n.5 (1969).
100. W. DOUGLAS, WE THE JUDGES 389 (1956).
101. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 724 (1961).
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theory into practice remains the arduous task of defining in
terms of courtroom practice and procedure what is meant by
"impartiality," "general objection," or "conscientious scruple."
The totality of these processes is the jury system as it is now
interpreted. The system is not perfect. The Sears case is repre-
sentative of only another step toward making the system more
nearly so.
FiPtwx IH. GiBBEs, III
*See Park v. State, 170 S.E2d 687 (Ga. 1969), and State v. Atkinson,
Smith's Adv. Sht., No. 2, Op. No. 19004 (S.C. Jan. 13, 1970); both cases,
decided after this comment initially was sent to the publisher, are especially
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